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ABSTRACT 
The design, development, and operation of 
complex space, lunar and planetary 
exploration systems require the development 
of general procedures that describe a 
detailed set of instructions capturing how 
mission tasks are performed. For both 
crewed and uncrewed NASA systems, 
mission safety and the accomplishment of 
the scientific mission objectives are highly 
dependent on the correctness of procedures. 
In this paper, we describe how to use the 
auto-generated diagnostic trees from 
existing diagnostic models to improve the 
verification of standard operating 
procedures. Specifically, we introduce a 
systematic method, namely the Diagnostic 
Tree for Verification (DTV), developed with 
the goal of leveraging the information 
contained within auto-generated diagnostic 
trees in order to check the correctness of 
procedures, to streamline the procedures in 
terms of reducing the number of steps or use 
of resources in them, and to propose 
alternative procedural steps adaptive to 
changing operational conditions. The 
application of the DTV method to a 
spacecraft electrical power system shows the 
feasibility of the approach and its range of 
capabilities.*  
                                                 
* This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License, which 
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided the original author and source are credited. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The design, development, and operation of complex 
space, lunar and planetary exploration systems require 
the development of general procedures that describe a 
detailed set of instructions capturing how mission tasks 
are performed (Frank, 2008). These procedures include 
a complicated mix of software checks and calibrations, 
conditional commands, manual inputs and checks of 
console data, and inspection of physical equipment. For 
both crewed and uncrewed NASA systems, mission 
safety and the accomplishment of the scientific mission 
objectives are highly dependent on the correctness of 
the procedures. It is therefore imperative that these 
procedures are verified and validated before being used. 
However, the development, inspection and verification 
of these procedures remain a key technical challenge 
for various reasons. 
First, the development of the standard operating 
procedures by system designers is currently labor-
intensive and critically dependent on human expertise 
(Kortenkamp et al., 2008). The process generates 
thousands of pages of documentation and many 
opportunities for human error.  
Second, operators using these procedures face the 
challenge of how to handle changes to system 
reconfiguration or system health conditions that can 
arise during real-time operations. Often, general 
procedures need to be adapted to specific mission 
conditions in a manner that is safe and effective. 
Moreover, procedures - especially those covering 
contingencies - are static in nature and only specify a 
single path to recovery. This non-redundant approach 
makes it difficult for operators and flight controllers to 
interpret appropriate next steps if a particular step in a 
procedure becomes invalid or non-applicable, e.g., 
because the resource to be used is unavailable. 
Third, procedures concerning off-nominal scenarios 
only cover single point failures. Accordingly, each step 
in a procedure defines local checks and calibrations of 
physical parameters and data associated with a 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20100023446 2019-08-29T18:24:02+00:00Z
Annual Conference of the Prognostics and Health Management Society, 2009 
 2  
particular anomaly. This makes it difficult to respond to 
multiple faults in a system, or to single faults where the 
proper response demands integration of data from a 
large number of sensors and reasoning based on a 
multitude of data sources.  
This paper introduces a systematic method, namely 
the Diagnostic Tree for Verification (DTV), developed 
with the goal of addressing the aforementioned three 
challenges. The basis of the DTV approach is to 
leverage knowledge and automated analyses already 
available in model-based diagnostic systems. 
Specifically, the DTV method describes how to use 
auto-generated diagnostic trees from existing diagnostic 
system models to (1) check the correctness of the 
procedures, (2) streamline the procedures in terms of 
reducing the number of steps or use of resources in 
them, and (3) propose alternative procedural steps 
adaptive to changing operational conditions including 
those anomalies arising from multiple faults in a 
system. The application of the presented method to the 
portions of a representative electrical power system 
(EPS), called the Advanced Diagnostic and Prognostic 
Testbed (ADAPT), demonstrates these capabilities.  
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows.  
Section 2 presents a review of related work in 
verification and validation of operational procedures. 
Section 3 introduces the Advanced Diagnostic and 
Prognostic Testbed that is used as a case example in 
this study. Section 4 describes the Diagnostic Tree for 
Verification method, the associated process and the 
evaluation metrics that can be used to measure the 
success of the proposed method. Section 5 discusses the 
application of the DTV method to the verification of a 
specific set of procedures developed for the ADAPT 
system. Section 6 summarizes the significance of the 
proposed approach and major challenges. Finally, 
Section 7 presents concluding remarks and an outlook 
for future work. 
2. RELATED WORK 
There are various techniques developed that can help 
verify and validate procedures.  
 Most current verification techniques are largely 
manual (inspection and reviews) and focus primarily on 
the conformance of command programs – scripts 
written for execution of procedures - to procedure 
definitions. Some advanced procedure authoring tools 
such as PRIDE (Kortenkamp et al., 2008) support 
syntax checking and can enforce syntax constraints.   
Automated approaches to verification provide much 
needed support to mission operations. These 
approaches enable the verification of syntactic and 
semantic differences in procedure scripts, and 
simulation capabilities to validate the equivalence and 
correctness relations between different system 
representations (Brat et al., 2008). 
Among these, static checkers verify that procedures 
are syntactically and semantically well written and 
structured. They are used to check for variable 
declarations, run-time errors, null pointers, operational 
bounds, order of procedure calls, etc. An example of a 
static analysis tool is the commercially available 
Polyspace C-verifier (Polyspace, 2008). Static checks, 
however, cannot catch all possible problems with 
procedures.  
A more improved verification method, model 
checking, allows for the systematic exploration of the 
state space of a system that captures all possible 
behaviors of a system. As a result, model checkers can 
find errors in models like deadlocks, race conditions, or 
can verify whether a system reach into a desired state. 
Examples of model checkers used in space applications 
include LTSA (2009), and Java Path Finder (Visser et 
al., 2003). 
Model checking has also been used outside of the 
engineering domain. For example, Damas et al. (2009) 
use model checking to analyze cancer treatment 
processes. The processes are described as guarded high-
level message sequence charts that are then compiled 
into guarded Labeled Transition Systems.  The focus of 
this research is on assembling clinical process 
fragments into a model for automated guard analysis 
and property verification rather than, as here, on using 
existing models to check and streamline operational 
procedures.   
In this work, we are interested in moving beyond 
traditional verification of correctness and consistency of 
the procedures toward improved correctness. By 
improved correctness, we mean alternative, better ways 
to achieve tasks intended by standard operating 
procedures. To accomplish this, the DTV method seeks 
to exploit knowledge and automated analysis 
techniques applied for the diagnostic process by model-
based diagnosis systems. 
Model-based reasoning methods utilize a wide 
variety of engineering models as the foundation for 
representing diagnostic knowledge and developing 
algorithms that use this knowledge for fault detection 
and isolation. In parallel developments, different 
communities have found value in analytic state-based 
models, input-output transfer function models, fault 
propagation models, and quantitative physics-based 
models to develop online automated diagnostic 
software for monitoring and diagnosis of dynamical 
systems (Patterson-Hine et al., 2005). 
3. CASE EXAMPLE: ADAPT - ELECTRICAL 
POWER SYSTEM TESTBED 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the 
ADAPT system and describe its major elements. 
The Advanced Diagnostics and Prognostics Testbed 
(ADAPT) at the NASA Ames Research Center is a 
unique facility designed to test, measure, evaluate, and 
mature diagnostic and prognostic health management 
technologies. Reflecting the importance of electrical 
power systems (EPS) in aerospace (Button and 
Chicatelli, 2005; Poll et al., 2007), ADAPT provides a 
representative aerospace vehicle EPS that enables 
automated diagnosis in a complex domain. A simplified 
version of main functions and layout of the ADAPT 
power system are shown in Figure 1. The EPS can 
deliver power to various loads, which in an aerospace 
vehicle would include subsystems such as the avionics, 
propulsion, life support, and thermal management 
systems. 
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ADAPT contains elements common to many 
aerospace applications: power storage and power 
distribution. In the simplified version used in this study, 
the power storage consists of two battery modules. 
Either of the two batteries can be used to power either 
of the two load banks in the power distribution element. 
This design gives the ADAPT EPS basic redundancy 
and reconfiguration capability. Electromechanical 
relays are used to route the power from the sources to 
the batteries, and from the batteries to the loads. An 
inverter converts the DC battery input to AC output. 
Circuit breakers are located at various points in the 
distribution network to prevent overcurrents from 
causing unintended damage to the system components. 
A data acquisition and control system sends 
commands to and receives data from the EPS. Testbed 
operator stations are integrated into a software 
architecture that allows for nominal and faulty 
operations of the EPS, and includes a system for 
logging all relevant data. The instrumentation allows 
for monitoring of voltages, currents, temperatures, 
switch positions, light intensities, and AC frequencies, 
and includes over 100 sensors. (More information on 
the ADAPT testbed can be found in (Poll et al., 2007)). 
Later in this paper, we use models and examples 
from the ADAPT system to illustrate the use and 
feasibility of the DTV methodology.  
4. DIAGNOSTIC TREE FOR VERIFICATION 
(DTV) METHOD 
The DTV method seeks to exploit knowledge and 
automated analysis techniques applied for the 
diagnostic process by model-based diagnosis systems. 
These tools utilize information from the design phase, 
such as safety and mission assurance analysis, failure 
modes and effects analysis (FMEA), fault propagation 
models and testability analysis, and employ topological 
and analytical models of the nominal and faulty 
operations of a system for fault diagnosis, isolation, and 
recovery (Patterson-Hine et al., 2005). This information 
provides an independent perspective that the DTV 
method uses in order not only to verify the correctness 
and consistency of standard operating procedures, but 
also to improve the procedures themselves. The details 
of the proposed method are explained in the next 
sections, but first a brief overview of procedures is 
given. 
 
Figure 1.  The simplified schematic of the ADAPT EPS System (Ghosal and Azam, 2008) 
  
 
Figure 2.  The graphical user interface showing the 
display for a procedure of a relay anomaly in the 
ADAPT system (McCann et al., 2006) 
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4.1 Procedures 
Franks (2008) defines procedures as: “A procedure is a 
detailed set of instructions specifying how a piece of 
equipment is operated, or a task is to be performed. 
Each step of a procedure may have conditions that must 
be satisfied before it can take place, and effects that 
must be understood when considering the implications 
on other steps of procedures. Procedure execution 
involves issuing commands to spacecraft, robots or 
systems; interpreting the responses of those systems; 
and choosing the next step in the procedure based on 
those responses. Procedures embody the engineering 
knowledge of the system or equipment involved in the 
tasks, and cover both nominal and off-nominal cases 
that arise.” The procedures can be represented in human 
understandable format such as in PRL (Kortenkamp et 
al., 2008), or machine-readable format such as in 
PLEXIL (Verma et al., 2005). 
In this research, we are focusing on two generic 
classes of procedures: procedures to diagnose/isolate a 
particular failure in a system, and procedures to recover 
from a failure in a system.  
An example procedure is shown in Figure 2. This 
procedure describes how to isolate “a relay anomaly” in 
the ADAPT system and how to recover from it by 
reconfiguring the system. The operational steps in the 
procedure include checks/tests/verification of the 
physical and software parameters of the system, 
commands to and from the system, and manual and 
automated actions for recovery.  
4.2 DTV Modeling Environment: TEAMS 
This section explains the modeling environment used 
by the DTV methodology. 
The Testability Engineering and Maintenance System 
(TEAMS) tool suite (QSI, 2009) is the primary 
platform used for modeling by the DTV method. 
TEAMS is built upon the multi-signal modeling 
formalism (Deb et al., 1995), which is a hierarchical 
modeling methodology where the propagation paths of 
the effects of a failure are captured using directed 
graphs. The model is based on structural connectivity or 
a conceptual block diagram of a physical system 
connected by links or paths. Software modules 
interfacing with the system are treated like any other 
hardware component, and can be included in the model. 
Functions describe attributes of system variables to be 
traced. The TEAMS modeling elements called test 
points are then added to the model. Test points 
represent the physical or computational locations of 
checks using sensors or sensor data as well as other 
means for observing a system. Tests are checks that 
look at the data from the sensors and make decisions 
about system attributes associated with those 
measurements. This graph topology is then converted 
into a matrix representation describing the relationship 
between faults and test points for a given mode of the 
system. This representation contains the basic 
information needed to interpret test results and diagnose 
failures during operations. In addition, actions 
corresponding to recovery and maintenance tasks are 
included in the TEAMS model. 
 
 
Figure 3.  An excerpt from diagnostic tree for a temperature anomaly in the ADAPT system. 
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4.3 Diagnostic Trees 
The DTV method uses existing TEAMS models to 
systematically explore the diagnostic trees that can be 
produced from the relationships between faults, tests, 
and actions in the model. A diagnostic tree describes a 
sequence of checks based on the results of prior checks. 
Different operational modes or configurations have 
different diagnostic trees since some faults are only 
possible, and some checks are only appropriate or 
available, in certain configurations or modes of 
operation.  
For faults that cannot be detected and/or isolated, the 
diagnostic tree shows the set of indistinguishable 
failures, called ambiguity groups. Thus, all the nodes of 
the diagnostic tree at the top-level and the intermediate 
levels are tests in the model. The leaf nodes of the 
diagnostic tree are either fault-handling actions (e.g., 
remove/replace a failed part/component) that have been 
specified for each component in the model, faults that 
have been isolated but for which there is currently no 
recovery possible, or an ambiguity group of faults that 
cannot currently be detected and isolated by the 
available tests.  
An example diagnostic tree is shown in Figure 3. 
This diagnostic tree describes how to isolate “a 
temperature anomaly” in the ADAPT system. Similar to 
the procedures, the steps in the diagnostic tree include 
checks/tests/verification of the physical and software 
parameters of the system, and manual and automated 
actions for recovery and maintenance. 
4.4 Analysis of Procedures using Auto-Generated 
Diagnostic Trees 
The diagnostic trees can be auto-generated from 
existing TEAMS models, thus making the DTV method 
easy to adopt. By dynamically exploring the model 
using the set of diagnostic trees generated, one can gain 
insight into the efficacy and efficiency of alternative 
fault-isolation and recovery paths.  
By comparing the sequence of steps described in the 
procedure to isolate the causes of the anomaly and 
recover from it with the diagnostic paths of the 
diagnostic tree, we seek to find relationships between 
the two representations as illustrated in Figure 4.  
Our current effort is aimed at finding any shorter 
sequence of tests and actions (i.e., a shorter path) that 
produces the same results (i.e., isolates the same fault, 
or recovers from a malfunction), for comparable or 
lesser cost in time or resources. This extends our 
previous work on three NASA applications (an 
unpiloted aerial vehicle, MER critical pointing 
software, and ADAPT) that showed how early 
consideration of potential anomalies using the 
diagnostic tree could help build in robustness for 
handling software contingencies (Lutz et al., 2008; Lutz 
et al., 2007; Lutz and Patterson-Hine, 2008a; Lutz and 
Patterson-Hine, 2008b). 
This comparison is currently performed manually, 
however, we are working towards developing a 
representation that would capture the information 
contained within the procedures and diagnostic trees 
using a common language, such that the comparative 
analysis can be done in an automated fashion.  
4.5 Metrics for Evaluation of the DTV Method 
There are three types of metrics that one can use to    
evaluate the usefulness of the DTV approach: 
  
1. Correctness 
a. Path coverage. Determine whether the operational 
procedure covers all the paths in the diagnostic tree 
auto-generated by the model. 
b. Branch coverage. Determine whether the 
operational procedure covers all the branches (i.e., 
includes all the tests) in the diagnostic tree auto-
generated by the model.  
 
2. Reduced complexity 
a. Shorter path. Does the diagnostic tree identify an 
operational procedure that is equivalent in terms of 
isolating the same fault(s) as the operational procedure, 
but that contains fewer steps? 
b. Fewer branches. Does the diagnostic tree identify 
an operational procedure that is equivalent in terms of 
isolating the same fault(s) as the operational procedure, 
but that contains fewer tests? 
 
3. Improved efficiency 
a. Resource usage.  Does the diagnostic tree identify 
an operational procedure that is equivalent in terms of 
isolating the same fault(s) as the operational procedure, 
but that uses fewer resources. Of most interest are 
consumable resources e.g., manual steps (requiring 
human labor), power-cycling steps of a spacecraft 
instrument (where a maximum number of lifetime 
cycles will be allowed).   
b. Reduced cost.  This class of metrics is closely 
related to the resource usage. Since specific costs 
(financial, power, or duration) can be associated with 
specific tests. Construction of the diagnostic tree can be 
directed to use these costs and may be able to identify 
lower-cost alternatives.   
 
Figure 4.  Overview of the developed DTV method. 
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c. Increased autonomy.  If a high cost is assigned to 
tests requiring human-in-the-loop (e.g., where a switch 
must be thrown manually) and low cost to automated 
alternatives (e.g., software commanding a change in the 
switch position), the auto-generated diagnostic tree will 
seek to minimize the cost.  Our hope (not realized in 
our current application) is that this may result in the tree 
displaying an alternative trouble-shooting strategy that 
offers increased opportunity for autonomy over an 
existing manual procedure. 
d. Improved sensor and test placement.  Because the 
model can be easily modified to add, delete, change, or 
move sensors, testpoints, and tests, the effects of 
alternative design decisions can be investigated.  By 
comparing the resulting diagnostic trees with the 
original diagnostic tree, improvements in the 
operational procedures that would be feasible, e.g., with 
an additional sensor or test, may be identified.   
5. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
To demonstrate the feasibility of the DTV technique, 
we are applying it to portions of a representative 
electrical power system (EPS), previously introduced in 
Section 3.  
The TEAMS model developed for this purpose 
consists of basic hardware components including 
batteries, relays, circuit breakers, a set of operational 
loads, etc., and sensors measuring the physical 
characteristics of the system. In addition, the model 
includes the software architecture of the system, mainly 
a data acquisition and control system that sends 
commands to and receives data from the testbed.  
The operational procedures for the EPS system are 
modified from an advanced caution and warning system 
developed as an interface concept for a crewed vehicle 
(McCann et al., 2006).  
In running these analyses, we first identify the 
symptoms (or observable states) of the system that 
correspond to off-nominal conditions in the system. An 
example is a “relay failure”. We then set particular 
symptoms to be active in the TEAMS model by using 
the user interface menu provided for all symptoms 
defined in the model. This automatically generates a 
diagnostic tree by forcing the analyzed symptom to be 
the root node of the tree. As described before, the 
diagnostic trees capture a sequence of tests, checks, and 
set-up that needs to be performed in order to 
diagnose/isolate the fault that is causing the analyzed 
symptom. The isolated fault(s) may also be annotated 
with recovery actions in the model, in which case these 
actions also appear in the appropriate intermediate or 
leaf nodes of the diagnostic tree. 
Similarly, the procedures in (McCann et al, 2006) 
describe the steps required to isolate a fault and recover 
from it in the system.  
As a preliminary result, we present two scenarios and 
the analysis of two associated procedures that illustrates 
how the procedures can be verified for branch coverage 
(metric 1b), and fewer branches (metric 2b).  
In the first scenario, the observed symptom is 
“battery output voltage low anomaly”. The actual 
component that has failed in the system is the “Battery 
1 voltage sensor, EI-135 in Figure 1. An excerpt from 
the procedure that deals with this anomaly is shown in 
Figure 5.  
In summary, this procedure includes steps to:  
 
1. verify the operational mode (or configuration) of 
the EPS system (in this case Battery 1 powers AC Load 
A1),  
2.  check the battery output voltage (EI 135 reading), 
and if low,  
3.   command Battery 1 off and Battery 2 on, 
4.  command Relay EY 241, EY 260, and EY 274 
closed,  
5.   check the temperature of AC Load A2 (TE 505), 
6. verify the reconfigured operational mode (or 
configuration) of the EPS system (now Battery 2 
powers AC Load B2.) 
 
This procedure basically checks for a battery failure 
and reconfigures the system to use the redundant 
battery to power an identical load type, which was 
supported in the intended operational mode of the 
system. 
However, the procedure is missing a “test” that could 
have disambiguated between a false alarm due to a 
sensor failure (EI 135) and an actual battery failure 
(Battery 1). As a result, it directly prompts for 
reconfiguration of the system to use the redundant 
battery power. The TEAMS model and the auto 
 
 
Figure 5.  Excerpt from a “battery output voltage low 
anomaly” procedure for the ADAPT EPS system. 
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generated diagnostic tree can easily identify this 
“missing test” (metric 1b) which would eliminate the 
possibility of a sensor failure and verify an actual 
battery failure. The addition of this test to the 
procedures would have prevented an unnecessary and 
costly reconfiguration of the system. 
In the second scenario, the observed symptom is 
“load bank relay position anomaly”. The actual 
component that has failed in the system is the “Load 
Bank A Relay Position Sensor, ESH 170 in Figure 1.  
In summary, the procedure that deals with this 
anomaly includes steps to:  
 
1. verify the operational mode (or configuration) of 
the EPS system (in this case Battery 1 powers AC Load 
A1),  
2. verify the relay position sensor output (ESH 170 
reading) to be open,  
3. verify Inverter 1 output voltage (EI 165) is within 
operational limits, 
     4.  if true, check the temperature output of AC 
Load A1 (TE-500),  
 5. if within operational limits conclude ESH 
170 sensor failure, or  
 6. if outside of operational limits go to 
Procedure Inverter 1 Output Voltage Anomaly, 
 7. if zero conclude EY 170 relay failure, or 
     8. if false, go to …. 
 
This scenario basically checks for a load bank relay 
failure, disambiguates between a relay and relay sensor 
failure and reconfigures the system to use the redundant 
load bank in case of a relay failure (not included in the 
procedural steps above). 
The procedure includes 3 checks (ESH 170, EI 165, 
and TE 500) to conclude that the anomaly is a relay 
sensor failure. However, the same diagnosis can be 
made by using only two of the available tests (ESH 170 
followed by TE500). The TEAMS model and the auto 
generated diagnostic tree can easily identify this path 
with fewer tests (metric 2b), which would reduce the 
complexity of the procedure.  
Running similar analyses using the DTV method, we 
found some critical ambiguity groups (of size three and 
four) in ADAPT. For example, there was no voltage 
sensor between a circuit breaker and a relay, so no 
procedural check can currently distinguish between 
failures of these two. In another case, the DTV method 
identified that a connector failure could not be 
distinguished from a sensor failure by available tests. In 
addition, we found some faults that could only be 
detected by human observation of symptoms.  
These preliminary results are promising in that they 
illustrate how the DTV method can be used by system 
designers, procedure developers, and flight operators in 
order to document gaps in procedures as well as to 
identify potential improvement areas.  
6.    DISCUSSION 
There are several unique aspects of the developed DTV 
method.  
First, it provides the ability to identify limitations, 
missing steps, and potential improvements that can be 
used for the verification of procedures. Using the DTV 
method, system designers can identify some 
adjustments to the procedures that might offer savings 
in terms of reduced complexity (e.g., fewer steps, fewer 
branches), increased efficiency (e.g., faster results), 
increased autonomy (e.g., more fault isolation done in 
software), and/or reduced cost (e.g., reduced usage of 
scarce resources).  
The DTV approach is especially useful for complex 
systems with redundant elements or functional 
redundancy. As is illustrated by the second scenario, the 
diagnostic tree may show that the same fault space can 
be covered by checking only a certain subset of the 
available sensors. In this case, one can consider 
adjusting the procedure to take advantage of this 
improved efficiency option. This goes beyond 
traditional verification methods that focus solely on the 
correctness and consistency of the procedures.  
Second, the DTV method provides flexibility in 
exploring alternative ways of performing diagnosis and 
recovery actions under changing operational conditions. 
For example, it can suggest appropriate next steps to 
operators that are not captured by the original procedure 
definitions. TEAMS also makes it easier to verify 
appropriate procedures where propagation of faults can 
occur in a large system with several functionally 
redundant units. For example, the diagnostic checks are 
divided into seven categories so that one can choose to 
produce diagnostic trees, for example, only involving 
checks of temperature sensors. Similarly, since some 
tests are appropriate only for certain modes of 
operation, one can restrict the diagnostic tree to those 
checks relevant to a particular mode of operation (e.g., 
when Battery 1 is powering Load 1).   
Third, the DTV approach uses system models that are 
already being constructed by NASA as part of the 
development process. This means that design 
knowledge does not need to be captured twice. The 
DTV method enables the system designers to exploit 
existing models for verification of procedures.   
Fourth, since the knowledge used by the DTV 
method is leveraged from existing diagnostic system 
models, it provides the ability to fuse information from 
multiple sensors and test points and to reason about 
multiple faults in a system for developing procedural 
steps that may fall outside the scope of original 
procedure definitions.  
Fifth, being able to maintain the TEAMS model by 
adding new components and then producing an updated 
diagnostic tree reduces the risk that change introduces 
in the procedures.  
Finally, challenges with which we are currently 
contending largely involve: (1) management of the 
relationships between the many-to-many elements in 
the model and in the procedural steps, (2) checks in the 
procedures involving human elements (e.g., 
intervention) not currently represented in the model and 
(3) scalability of the approach for larger systems. We 
hypothesize that our future work will show that 
Challenges 1 and 3 can be handled within the existing 
TEAMS framework and that Challenge 2 will 
encourage fuller representation of human-computer 
interactions in the models (i.e., will consider the human 
as part of the system to be modeled).  
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We presented a method, namely the Diagnostic Tree for 
Verification (DTV), developed with the goal of 
leveraging the information contained within auto-
generated diagnostic trees in order to assist the 
verification of standard operating procedures. 
Preliminary results indicate that the method presented 
here facilitates the identification of potential gaps in the 
coverage of the standard operating procedures. 
Specifically, our method helps identify: (1) 
inconsistencies between the information generated by 
diagnostic trees and ground test procedures, (2) missing 
checks/tests and responses between diagnostic trees and 
ground test procedures, (3) alternative paths for 
diagnosis/isolation and recovery actions than those 
suggested by operating procedures, and (4) an 
optimized strategy for diagnosis/isolation and recovery 
actions. With these unique capabilities, the DTV 
method offers opportunities for enhanced fault handling 
and increased mission safety and affectivity. 
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